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COMMENT
LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF
ENGLISH-ONLY LAWS IN THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTOR
INTRODUCTION
The recent English-only movement has produced state resolutions,
statutes, and constitutional amendments establishing English as the "offi-
cial" language. ' English-only rules are intended to eliminate governmen-
tal services in languages other than English. In the workplace, English-
only rules require employees to refrain from speaking languages other
than English on the employer's premises.2 Proponents of these measures
argue that the purpose of this legislation is to promote national unity and
protect the only common bond which holds our divergent society to-
gether.3 So far voters or legislators have enacted English legislation in 16
states,4 and nowhere has such an initiative been defeated at the polls. In
1986 California voters, by a margin of 73 to 27 percent, adopted a consti-
I. "U.S. English" is the largest, most aggressive, and most successful of the political groups
promoting English as the official language in the United States. It has grown rapidly, from 300
members in 1983 to 400,000 nationwide as of 1990, with about half of these members in California.
The activities of U.S. English include lobbying for a federal constitutional amendment making Eng-
lish the official language of the United States, restricting government funding for bilingual education
to short-term transitional programs, and supporting state official English statutes. Gonzalez, Schott,
and Vasquez, The English Language Amendment: Examining Myths, 77 ENGLISH J. 24 (1988); Bern-
stein, In U.S. Schools A War of Words, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 14, 1990, Sec. 6:34, 48
(1990). Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 293, 300(1989).
2. Note, English-only Rules and Innocent Employers" Clarifying National Origin Discrimina-
tion and Disparate Impact Theory under Title VII, 74 MINN. L. Rev. 74 (1989). [Hereinafter Eng-
lish-only Rules and 'Innocent' Employers].
3. For a good discussion on this point see J. Leibowicz, The Proposed English Language
Amendment: Shield or Sword? 3 YALE L. & Pol'Y Rev. 519 (1985).
4. Only two states, Nebraska in 1920 and Illinois in 1923, (see NEB. Const. art I, § 27, and
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I para. 3005 (1990), declared English as their only official language prior to the
beginning of the English-only movement, which was set in motion at the beginning of the 1980s by
U.S. English. The other states are: Alabama in 1990, ALA. 1901 CONST., Amend. 509; Arkansas in
1987, 1987 ARK. AcTs 40; California in 1986, CAL. CONST. art. III § 6; Colorado in 1988, COLO.
CONST. art II, § 30(a); Florida in 1988, FLA. Const. art. II, § 9; Georgia in 1986, 1986 GA. Laws 70,
Indiana in 1984; IND. CODE ANN. tit. 1, art. 2, ch. 10 § 1 (1988); Kentucky in 1984, Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (1985); Mississippi in 1987, Miss. CODE ANN. § 3-3-31 (1989); North Carolina
in 1987, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 145-12 (Supp. 1987); South Carolina in 1987, S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-
696 (1988); Tennessee in 1984, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-404 (1985); and Virginia in 1981, VA.
CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.1 (1985). Since 1978 Hawaii has been officially bilingual-Native Hawaiian
and English are coequal languages, see HAWAII CONST. art. xv, § 4.
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tutional amendment declaring English the state's official language. In
1988 Florida voters approved a similar amendment by 84 to 16 percent.
U.S. English and other proponents of English only claim that such
laws are only intended to restrict governmental services in languages
other than English.' Since English is indisputably the primary language
of the United States, with ninety-eight percent of the inhabitants speak-
ing it,6 declaring English the official language appears harmless. How-
ever benign the declaration of an "Official" language seems, such laws
may have severe discriminatory repercussions.7
Restrictive language practices have also appeared in the workplace.
Employer rules which prohibit minority-language workers from speaking
in their native languages to coworkers are widespread.8 While Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws employment discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, the statute does not
expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of language.' An impor-
tant question is to what degree language discrimination is construed by
the courts as national origin discrimination, which is an area protected
by Title VII.O
Official English legislation gives rise to numerous legal issues. Despite
its obvious importance, there has been relatively little scholarly attention
directed toward the issue of language rights in the United States. This
Comment analyzes the issues raised by English-only rules: state consti-
tutional laws and statutes, and workplace rules restricting services and
discourse to the English language. Part I reviews the historical and so-
cial conditions that have influenced the rise of the recent English-only
laws. In part II, the major equal protection and First Amendment cases
on language rights will be analyzed. Part III discusses the English-only
laws in the workplace. The courts have been severely split in their inter-
5. Chen, Language Rights in the Private Sector, in Languange LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK
ON THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE CONTROVERSY (1991).
6. See Califa, supra note 1, at 294.
7. Following passage of Official English initiatives in Arizona, Colorado and Florida in 1989,
there were several instances of language discrimination including the suspension of a supermarket
clerk for answering a fellow-employee in Spanish, the denial of parole to non-English speaking pris-
oners in Arizona until confusion over the official English law was cleared up, and an instance of a
school-bus driver in Colorado reprimanding children for speaking Spanish on the school bus. Epic
Events (Newsletter of the English Plus Information Clearinghouse), March/April 1989. In North
Carolina, after the passage of the Official English statute, the Department of Motor Vehicles stopped
giving driver's license tests in languages other than English, as it had previously. It was not until the
intervention of the North Carolina Civil Liberties Union that the statute was amended to read that
the Division of Motor Vehicles "shall not be permitted to... discontinue providing drivers' license
examinations in any language previously administered." N.C. GEN. STAT. 145-11 § 1.1, letter from
North Carolina Civil Liberties Union, August 21, 1987.
8. See the incidents described in Note, English-Only Rules and 'Innocent' Employers, supra
note 2.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1981 & Supp. 1991).
10. See infra notes 124-155 and accompanying text.
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pretation of Title VII and whether laws requiring English to be spoken
on the job violate the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Part IV examines four of
the most important statutory language for non-English speakers: the Bi-
lingual Education Act of 196811 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,12 the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974,"3 and the fed-
eral Voting Rights Act as amended in 1975 and extended in 1982.14 Part
V critically examines the policy implications of state Official English
laws. A major question that remains to be answered is whether these are
merely symbolic statutes or whether they can be used to the disadvantage
of language minorities.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF LANGUAGE PROTECTION AND RESTRICTION
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Reasons for Lack of an Official Language
Despite the lack of constitutional protection, English in the United
States has come to enjoy a privileged position. John Adams's proposal to
set up a national language academy, which would have in effect made
English the official language, was debated and rejected by the founding
fathers.15 The idea of government regulating American speech was
deemed to be incompatible with the spirit of freedom of speech in the
United States. 6 During the nation's first century there was, in general, a
laissez-faire attitude governing language issues. 17 For example, the Arti-
cles of Confederation were printed in German, and at different times fed-
eral documents appeared in French, German, Dutch and Swedish. 8
Bilingual instruction was common throughout the nineteenth century
in both private and public schools. It was explicitly authorized by law in
states like Ohio (English-German 1839) and Louisiana (French-English,
1847). "9 The German influence in Pennsylvania was so substantial that
German schools received public funding well into the nineteenth
century.20
11. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 3281-3386 (1990).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1981 & Supp. 1990).
13. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1991).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1981 & Supp. 1991).
15. Baugh and Cable, A History of the English LANGUAGE, 254-69, (1978); Heath, A National
Language Academy? Debate in the New Nation, 11 INT'L J. Soc. LANG. 9, 19-22 (1976).
16. Marshall, The Question of an Official Language: Language Rights and the English Lan-
guage Amendment, 60 INT'L J. Soc. LANG. 7, 11 (1986).
17. Heath, supra note 15 at 9-43.
18. Kloss, THE AMERICAN BILINGUAL TRADITION, 6-7 (1977).
19. Id. at 84.
20. Conklin and Lourie, A HosT OF TONGUES, 65 (1983).
1992]
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B. The Rise of Language Restriction
By the middle of the nineteenth century, a stronger central govern-
ment reduced the importance of tongues other than English. Beginning
in the 1870s, the U.S. government began forcing Indian children into
boarding schools and punishing them for using their own dialects.2 ' Af-
ter the United States acquired Puerto Rico in the Spanish-American
War, federal authorities mandated English as the sole language of in-
struction on the island.22 In New Mexico, which was ceded to the
United States in 1848, English speakers remained a minority until
1900.23 Spanish-speakers shared political and economic power with An-
glos, and the Spanish version of bilingual territorial laws generally took
precedence over the English in disputed cases.24 However, the United
States government refused to grant statehood until 1912, when Anglos
finally outnumbered Hispanics, thereby putting an end to any challenge
by Spanish to the pre-eminence of English in American life and to the
possibility of official bilingualism at the state level.25
1. The Americanization Movement
The first English language requirement for naturalization was adopted
with the explicit purpose of limiting the entrance into the United States
of Southern and Eastern Europeans.26 In 1916, the National Americani-
zation Committee, which worked closely with the federal Bureau of Edu-
cation, sponsored a bill in Congress to deport all aliens who would not
apply for citizenship within three months.27 During the war, the idea of
expulsion as an alternative to assimilation was frequently discussed.2"
The National Americanization Committee proposed requiring all aliens
to learn English and apply for citizenship within three years or face
deportation.29
After 1900, Italians, Jews and Slavs began to outnumber Irish,
Germans, and Scandinavians.3° Immigrants were arriving in such
number, and were so concentrated in urban areas, that many observers
21. Park, Historical Foundations of Language Policy: The Nez-Perce, in Language Renewal
Among American Indian Tribes (St. Clair and Leap eds. 1982).
22. Language Policy Task Force, Language Policy and the Puerto Rican Community 5 BILIN-
GUAL REV. 6, 6-9 (1978).
23. Schmid, Language and Education Rights in the United States and Canada, 36 INTERN. &
COMp. L. Q. 903, 905 (1987).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND. PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925, 101
(1967).
27. Id. at 248, 259.
28. Id. at 248.
29. Id. at 249.
30. CRAWFORD, BILINGUAL EDUCATION: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 22
(1989).
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questioned whether it was possible for the new immigrants to fit into
American society.31 Religious prejudice was joined with "pseudoscien-
tific" racial theories. In addition, linguistic differences also helped in cre-
ating negative stereotypes and in arousing antipathy against the
newcomers.32 In 1911, the federal Dillingham Commission complained
that the "new" immigrants - the Italians, Jews and Slavs - were much
slower "to learn the English language, and to abandon native customs
and standards of living" than "old" nineteenth century immigrants from
Ireland, Germany and Scandinavia.33 For the first time in American his-
tory, an ideological link was forged between language and
"Americanism." 34
By 1919, twenty-three states had enacted laws restricting instruction in
foreign languages.35 Many of these states mandated English as the exclu-
sive language of instruction in the primary grades.36 On the eve of the
First World War, the fear of Germans as the largest, most cohesive eth-
nic group, made their language especially susceptible to special prohibi-
tion.37 It took the Supreme Court in 1923 to strike down the most
extreme of these laws.
2. Meyer v. Nebraska
In Meyer v. Nebraska,38 the United States Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of a Nebraska schoolteacher. Robert Meyer was charged with
the crime of teaching a Bible story in German at a private school to a ten
year old child. 39 The Nebraska statute prohibited the teaching of any
language other than English to a child who had not passed the eighth
grade.'
The Court determined that the right to teach a language and the right
of parents to engage a teacher to instruct children in a foreign language
are among the liberties protected against state infringement by the Due
31. Wagner, The Historical Background of Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the United States,
THE NEW BILINGUALISM 39, (Ridge, 1981).
32. Id.
33. Crawford, supra note 30, at 60.
34. Id. at 22.
35. Ross, A Judicial Janu" Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U. ON. L. REV.
125, 133 (1988).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 130, 133, n.44. Louisiana had one of the most restrictive laws, which stated: [i]t shall
be unlawful for any teacher, professor, lecturer, person or persons employed in the public, private,
elementary or high schools, colleges, universities, or other institutions.., that in any way form part
of the public or private educational system or educational work in the state of Louisiana, to teach the
German language to any pupils or class. LA. LAWS OF 1918, act 114, § 1.
38. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
39. Id. at 396-397.
40. Id. at 397.
19921
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Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 ' The Court went on to
note that: "The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those
who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the
tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready under-
standing of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods
which conflict with the Constitution .... 42
On the same day that Meyer was decided, the United States Supreme
Court struck down similar statutes in Ohio and Iowa.43 Nebraska, Iowa
and Ohio all attempted to show that there was a legitimate need for lan-
guage laws, and that they were within the police power of the states.'
Furthermore, the three states argued that the statutes were needed to
ensure that school children were educated into loyal and patriotic citi-
zens.43 In the Nebraska brief, it was argued that the legislation was
designed "to prevent children reared in America from being trained and
educated in foreign languages and foreign ideals before they have had an
opportunity to learn the English language and observe American
ideals.""
This brief history of language restriction in the United States shows
that language can be used as a mask for racial, economic and political
hostility of individuals who speak other tongues.47 A spirit of exclusive-
ness spread when a rapid influx of immigration coincided with a major
domestic and international crisis. Under these conditions a significant
segment of American society felt that national unity depended on main-
taining cultural homogeneity.48
C. The Current English-only Movement
Although today's Official English movement does not share the ex-
treme goals of the Americanization movement, there are many philo-
sophical similarities between the two movements. First, there is an
implicit comparison between "new" immigrants who are unwilling to as-
similate and "old" immigrants who readily assimilated to American cul-
ture. Second, there is an equation of linguistic diversity with political
41. Id. at 400. Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as
harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error
taught this language in school as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the
Amendment.
42. Id. at 401.
43. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409 (1923).
44. See Ross, supra note 35, at 175.
45. Id.
46. Id. Brief and Argument of State of Nebraska, Defendant in Error, Meyer v. Nebraska at 12-
13.
47. Leibowicz, supra note 3, at 538-539.
48. HIGHAM, supra note 26, at 234-262.
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disunity and fragmentation of the American culture. Finally, there is a
link between English proficiency and American identity.
After half a century of relative language peace, in the 1980s language
has again become the focus of a great deal of contention. Attempts to
protect the official status of the English language in American life have
appeared on both the local and national levels.49 An English Language
Amendment was introduced in the last five Congresses and has been re-
introduced in the 102nd Congress.50 There are several reasons why lan-
guage rights have emerged as one of the most important issues in the late
1980s. The United States has experienced another large wave of immi-
gration that has called attention to the country's linguistic diversity. Be-
tween 1961 and 1986, approximately 328,000 immigrants came from
China and Japan and 1,147,000 immigrated from Mexico. In 1987, the
United States accepted three hundred thousand Hispanic immigrants.51
Increased immigration has fostered the perception that newcomers are
no longer learning English. English-only advocates argue that for the
first time, a majority of immigrants speak one language - Spanish.5 2 Con-
trary to earlier waves of immigrants, they maintain that Spanish-speakers
are unwilling to learn English. 3 For this reason, most attempts to pro-
tect English, although facially neutral, have been targeted at Spanish
speakers.54
This stereotype is contradicted by empirical evidence. A recent study
by McCarthy and Valdez confirms a classic three-generation pattern of
language acquisition.55 The first generation is primarily monolingual, the
second generation is bilingual, and in the third generation English is the
preferred language over Spanish.56 A second study by Veltman con-
cludes that the rate of Anglicization by Spanish speakers cannot be dis-
tinguished from prior waves of immigrants. In fact, Spanish speakers are
fast approaching a two-generation pattern of language loss as compared
to the three-generation model typical of immigrant groups in the past."
Spanish monolingualism persists because of continued immigration, not
because Spanish immigrants fail to learn to speak English. 58
English-only advocates maintain that unless English is declared the
49. See Leibowicz supra note 3; Califa, supra note 1, at 303-305; USA Today, Oct. 11, 1990, at
A5, col 8.
50. Id.
51. See Note, English-only Rules and "Innocent" Employers, supra note 2, at n.16.
52. Califa, supra note 1, at 312-313.
53. Id. at 313-14.
54. Liebowicz, supra note 3, at 522.
55. MCCARTHY AND VALDEZ, CURRENT AND FUTURE EFFECTS OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION
IN CALIFORNIA (1986).
56. Id. at 65.
57. VELTMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE SPANISH LANGUAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 3, (1988).
58. Id. at 45.
1992]
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official language of the United States, the nation will become divided
along linguistic lines.59 This argument vastly underestimates the desire
of Hispanic parents to have their children learn English. A 1985 Miami
survey found that 98 percent of the Hispanic respondents said it was
"essential for children to read and write English perfectly," as compared
with 94 percent of Anglo respondents.60
The current English-only movement has created much of the divisive-
ness it seeks to avoid by polarizing the Hispanic and Anglo populations.
In a 1988 study of exit polls in California and Texas, Schmid concludes
that a majority of Anglos support laws making English the official lan-
guage of the United States, while Hispanics overwhelmingly reject it.6
Hispanics see the English-only movement as a new means to justify dis-
crimination, and a threat to their ethnic community.62 Anglos, on the
other hand, support "Official English" as the affirmation of a deeply held
conception of nationhood.6 a
Despite the philosophical similarities between the Americanization
and Official English movements, Califa observes that "recent immigrants
arrive in the United States with considerably more political empower-
ment than earlier immigrant groups.""6 To what extent are there more
legal language now for non-English speaking immigrants? Is there a con-
stitutional entitlement to language rights which was unavailable to ear-
lier newcomers?
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND LANGUAGE RIGHTS
The most obvious source of constitutional protection against govern-
ment sponsored language-based discrimination is the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 65 The Supreme Court applies a
"strict scrutiny" standard of review to classifications that infringe upon
rights considered "fundamental", or classifications that single out "sus-
pect classes". 66 Strict scrutiny has been interpreted as applying not only
to discrimination on the basis of race, but also to discrimination based on
59. CRAWFORD, supra note 30, at 54.
60. Id. at 60.
61. Schmid, The English-only Movement: Social Bases of Support and Opposition Among Anglos
and Latinos, in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE CONTRO-
VERSY (1991).
62. Id.
63. Citrin, Reingold, Walters, and Green, The "Official English" Movement and the Symbolic
Politics of Language in the United States, 43 WESTERN Pol. Q. 535 (1990).
64. Califa, supra note 1, at 299. He does not elaborate on this theme, however.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
66. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6 at 1451-54 (2d ed. 1988).
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national origin.6 7 Strict scrutiny has also been applied to categorizations
impinging upon fundamental rights such as privacy,6" marriage,69 vot-
ing, 70 travel, 71 and freedom of association. 72
An intermediate level of scrutiny is applied to classifications that im-
plicate the rights of "quasi-suspect" groups, such as classifications on the
basis of sex 73 or illegitimacy. 74 Under an intermediate level of scrutiny, a
statutory classification is validated if it substantially furthers a legislative
purpose.75 Classifications that do not implicate either specially protected
rights or specially protected persons are granted broad deference by the
courts utilizing the "rational basis" standard.76 The courts will uphold
the law so long as it has a rational or reasonable basis.7 7
A. The Rights of Language Minorities under the Constitution
There are few Supreme Court decisions on language rights. The few
cases which have vindicated the rights of language minorities have not
been based exclusively on language. In Meyer, the decision was based
primarily on the due process right of parents to rear their children with-
out state interference. 7 The Supreme Court relied on Meyer three years
later to declare unconstitutional a Philippine statute in Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad.79 That statute required Chinese merchants to keep their books
in English, Spanish, or in a local dialect, thereby prohibiting them from
utilizing the only language they understood. 0 The Court held that the
law was invalid "because it deprives Chinese persons - situated as they
are, with their extensive and important business long established - of
their liberty and property without due process of law, and denies them
the equal protection of the laws."'" Essentially the Court found that this
was a form of national origin discrimination against Chinese, although it
did not articulate a constitutional right to use one's native language per
se. The only other Supreme Court case addressing language rights, Lau
v. Nichols, decided the case on Title VI rather than on constitutional
67. In 1954 discrimination on the basis of "ancestry or national origin" was held to be prohib-
ited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954).
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-64 (1973).
69. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87 (1978).
70. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
71. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
72. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62 (1958).
73. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976).
74. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767-68 (1977).
75. L. TRIBE, supra note 66, at § 16-33, at 1610-18.
76. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
77. L. TRIBE, supra note 66, at § 16-2, at 1439-43.
78. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
79. 271 U.S. 500 (1926).
80. Id. at 528.
81. Id. at 524-25.
1992]
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grounds. 82
The Supreme Court has not resolved the question of whether lan-
guage-based discrimination constitutes a "suspect" class. A number of
legal scholars have argued that language-based discrimination should be
afforded strict scrutiny or at least intermediate level scrutiny.8 3 They
have emphasized the need for strict scrutiny because of the close relation-
ship to national origin discrimination. Like racial minorities, non-Eng-
lish speakers have suffered a history of discrimination (including voting
and access to political power), have been stigmatized by government ac-
tion, and have suffered economic and social disadvantage.84
In general, the courts have rejected an equal protection challenge to
language minorities unless the case involves a very close relationship to
national origin discrimination or involves rights considered fundamen-
tal.8" More common is the reasoning in Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 6
which rejected an equal protection challenge for the failure to provide
information in Spanish to Social Security recipients and applicants:
The Secretary's failure to provide forms and services in the Spanish lan-
guage, does not on its face make any classification with respect to His-
panics as an ethnic group. The classification is implicitly made, but it is
speaking versus non-English-speaking individuals, and not on the basis of
race, religion, or national origin. Language, by itself, does not identify
members of a suspect class.87
Employing similar reasoning, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held
that language is not synonymous with nationality. In the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Frontera v. Sindell, the Civil Service Commission in con-
ducting the examination in English, did not discriminate against a Span-
ish-speaking applicant on account of his nationality.88 The equal
protection clause does not require that the State attack all aspects of a
problem, "(i)t is enough that the State's action be rationally based and
free from invidious discrimination."8 9  In Carmona v. Sheffield, the
Ninth Circuit held that the failure to provide information in Spanish re-
garding unemployment insurance benefits was not violative of equal pro-
82. 414 U.S. 563 (1974); see infra notes 188-195 and accompanying text.
83. See Note, Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model, 90 YALE
L.J. 912 (1981); Comment, "Official English:" Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services
in the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345 (1987); Califa, supra note 1, at 332-335.
84. Id.; see especially Note, Quasi Suspect Classes, at 917-20.
85. See Olagues v. Russionello, 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 481 U.S. 1012,
vacated 484 U.S. 806 (1987), (the challenged investigation targeted recently registered, foreign-born
voters who requested bilingual ballots) and Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (in a case involving
jury selection, the Court linked discrimination on the basis of Spanish surnames to discrimination on
the basis of national origin).
86. 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984).
87. Id. at 41.
88. 522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975).
89. Id. at 1219.
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tection under the rational basis test-' Finally, in Pabon v. MacIntosh,
the court concluded that classes held only in English are not a violation
of the equal protection clause in the absence of a suspect classification or
a fundamental right.9 The standard of judicial review under the Equal
Protection Clause will continue to be a major issue in the area of lan-
guage rights. The current interpretation of the equal protection analysis
does not recognize language discrimination as a subset of national origin
discrimination. Therefore, English-only laws are not deemed "suspect."
B. Protection of Language Rights under the First Amendment
English-only laws imposed by the government on private businesses
may violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The First Amend-
ment prohibits government from abridging freedom of speech, expres-
sion, and association.92 The First Amendment is clearly implicated when
the government directly restrains the private use of foreign languages.93
The primary goal of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure equal treat-
ment against discrete and insular minorities, specifically on the grounds
of race and national origin or classifications that have an impact on fun-
damental rights.94
Very few cases have challenged official English laws or governmental
restraints on the use of foreign languages. The two cases that have impli-
cated the First Amendment are directly related to the 1980s English-only
movement. In Asian American Business Group v. City of Pomona, Po-
mona restricted the size and language of business signs. 95 The 1988 ordi-
nance provided that: "on-premises signs of commercial or manufacturing
establishments which have advertising copy in foreign alphabetical char-
acters shall devote at least one half of the sign area to advertising copy in
English alphabetical letters."96
The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on three major
grounds. First, the court observed that by requiring one half of the space
to be devoted to English characters, the ordinance regulates the cultural
expression of the sign owner, since the "language used is an expression of
national origin, culture and ethnicity." 97 Secondly, the ordinance as a
regulation of noncommercial speech fails to meet the standard of strict
scrutiny, by serving a compelling governmental interest.98 Finally, the
90. 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973).
91. 546 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
92. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 790.
93. Chen, supra note 5.
94. Supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
95. 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
96. Id. at 1329.
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ordinance burdens the freedom of expression, which is a fundamental
interest.99 American Asian Business Group, by restricting language usage,
appears to be closer in its reasoning to Yu Cong,' ° than to the cases in
which a public agency fails to offer information or tests in languages
other than English. 10 In both Yu Cong, and American Asian Business
Group, the state restricted the use of language and discriminated on the
basis of national origin. 102 A second recent case, Yniguez v. Mofford,
challenged on First Amendment grounds, found Arizona's Proposition
106, which was passed by voters in 1988, unconstitutional because it was
too broadly worded.'1 3 It would have prohibited governmental officers
and employees from using a foreign language in the performance of offi-
cial duties.'" The court held that a state may not "require that its of-
ficers and employees relinquish rights guaranteed them by the First
Amendment as a condition of public employment."'O' The law was
ruled unconstitutional on the ground of being "overbroad.'" 6 The court
did not have to reach the question of whether the First Amendment bars
English-only restrictions. Nor did it have to decide the more common
case in which employees in state offices would be required to cease speak-
ing in languages other than English - for example, state employees offi-
cially commenting on matters of public concern in a language other than
English or state judges performing marriage ceremonies in a language
other than English.' 07 The Arizona official English amendment was
much more restrictive than most other states. Therefore there is some
question whether the reasoning used in Yniguez could be used to chal-
lenge Official English laws in other jurisdictions.'0 8
99. Id. at 1332.
100. 271 U.S. 500.
101. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
102. 271 U.S. 500 (1926).
103. 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990).
104. The Arizona English Language Amendment, which amended Article XXVIII of the Ari-
zona constitution, applied to the legislature, executive and judicial branches of government, all polit-
ical branches, all statutes, and all government officials and employees. It required that except for
very narrow exceptions, the state and its officials must "act in English and in no other language." In
addition, it prohibited the enforcement of "[any] law, order, decree or policy which requires the use
of a language other than English", and permitted any person residing or doing business in Arizona
to have standing to bring a law suit. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § B1-3.
105. 703 F. Supp. at 314.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 313.
108. For example, the Florida English Amendment, by comparison only states (a) English is the
official language of the state of Florida and (b) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce this
section by appropriate legislation. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9.
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 [1992], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol20/iss1/6
LANGUAGE RIGHTS
III. ENGLISH-ONLY LAWS IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Coverage and Purpose of Title VII
Employees who work for private firms are generally not protected by
the United States Constitution, which protects against abuses by govern-
mental but not private entities." Although linguistic minorities lack
constitutional protection, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights ActlO pro-
vides some measure of protection. Title VII outlaws employment dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'
While the Supreme Court has declared alienage, which refers to nonci-
tizenship, to be a suspect criterion with respect to state action, this is not
the case under Title VII. In Espinoza v. Farah Mgf Co., the Supreme
Court held that a private employer's refusal to hire aliens did not consti-
tute discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act." 2 Title VII makes it unlawful to refuse to hire,
discharge, or "otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment.""' 3  Furthermore, it is forbidden for an employer to "limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee""I 4 on the basis of the prohibited criteria. While Title VII does
not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of language, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission has issued broad guidelines in de-
fining national-origin discrimination.' '" These include discrimination be-
cause of an "individual's or his ancestor's place of origin," or because an
"individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a na-
tional origin group. ' "16 The EEOC guidelines specifically recognize that
an individual's mother tongue or primary language is an important char-
acteristic of national origin.' 'I Although Title VII does not explicitly
authorize the EEOC to issue guidelines, the Supreme Court has con-
firmed the EEOC's authority to do so."' EEOC guidelines are generally
entitled to considerable deference so long as they are not inconsistent
109. TRIBE, supra note 66, § 18-1 at 1688-91.
110. Civil Rights Act of 1964, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to 2000(eX17) (1981
& Supp. 1990). (Workers who are employed by firms with fifteen or more employees are protected
under Title VII.)
111. Id. § 2000(e)(b).
112. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)2(1) (1981).
114. Id. § 2000(e)(2)(A)(2).
115. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1-.7
(1990).
116. Id. § 1606.1.
117. Id. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1990).
118. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). The Supreme Court found
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with Congressional intent." 9
Furthermore, the EEOC in response to Garcia v. Gloor,'20 where the
court held that language, at least for bilingual individuals was a "a mat-
ter of individual preference,"' 21 issued guidelines specifically addressing
English-only workplace rules. These guidelines have been broken down
into two categories: when employees are expected to speak English at all
times and when English-only rules are only applied at certain times.
When applied at all times, a rule requiring employees to speak only
English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition
of employment. The primary language of an individual is often an essen-
tial national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in
the workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language
they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an individual's employment
opportunities on the basis of national origin which could result in a dis-
criminatory working environment. Therefore, the Commission will pre-
sume that such a rule violates Title VII and will closely scrutinize it.
122
When applied only at certain times, an employer may have a rule requir-
ing that employees speak only in English at certain times where the em-
ployer can show that the rule is justified by business necessity.' 23
B. Narrow v. Broad Interpretation of National Origin
1. Language as a Matter of Individual Preference
The leading cases on whether English-only rules constitute national
origin discrimination are Garcia v. Gloor124 and Gutierrez v. Municipal
Court.'25 The two cases disagree, employing different interpretations of
the degree to which language may be considered national origin discrimi-
nation. Gloor, the only remaining precedent on the issue, establishes the
legality of English-only rules. 126 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that a bilingual employee fired for speaking Spanish on the job
had not stated a claim of national origin discrimination under Title
that the 1966 EEOC guidelines on employment testing procedures consistent with the act and, there-
fore, accorded them great deference.
119. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973).
120. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). (According to Mr. Robert
T. Olmos, who helped draft the EEOC guidelines, they were directly in response to the Gloor deci-
sion. Telephone interview on November 16, 1990.)
121. Id. at 270.
122. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 115, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7.
123. Id.
124. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
125. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
126. 618 F.2d 264 (1980). The Gloor court did not follow the EEOC guidelines on English-only
rules, since the EEOC had not yet issued any regulations or general policy on this topic at the time of
the ruling.
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VII.1 27 Hector Garcia, a Mexican American, was employed as a sales-
man for Gloor Lumber and Supply. His duties included selling lumber,
hardware and supplies in both Spanish and English. The store was lo-
cated in a heavily Hispanic area and many of Gloor's customers wished
to be waited on by a Spanish-speaking salesman.'2 '
Gloor Lumber had an English-only rule prohibiting its salesmen from
speaking Spanish unless they were speaking with Spanish-speaking cus-
tomers. The Hispanic salesman, with the exception of breaks, were not
allowed to speak to each other in Spanish. Garcia was discharged when
he spoke Spanish with another salesman during working hours.129 Gar-
cia sued, claiming that his discharge constituted national origin discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII. 13
The Court of Appeals held that language discrimination does not con-
stitute national origin discrimination. The choice of which language to
speak at a particular time is a matter of individual preference. "Neither
the statute nor common understanding equates national origin with the
language that one chooses to speak."' 3'' The court interpreted national
origin as one's birthplace or the birthplace of one's ancestors. Title VII
"does not support an interpretation that equates the language an em-
ployee prefers to use with his national origin."'' 3 2 Garcia argued that the
English-only rule had a disparate impact'33 on Hispanic Americans, even
if that result was not intentional, because the rule was likely to be vio-
lated only by Spanish speakers of Hispanic origin. 131 In disparate impact
cases, the employer uses "employment practices that are facially neutral
... but in fact fall more harshly on one group than another."' 35 There-
127. Id. at 270-71.
128. Id. at 266-67.
129. Id. at 266, 268.
130. Id. at 266.
131. Id. at 268.
132. Id. at 270.
133. Under Title VII, two theories exist whereby employees can show national origin discrimina-
tion: disparate impact and disparate treatment. Disparate treatment analysis is applicable to em-
ployment situations where similarly situated individuals are treated differently because of race, sex,
religion or national origin. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977). Relatively few language cases have been litigated employing disparate treatment
theory. The cases that most often utilize this analysis allege discrimination on the basis of manner of
speaking or accent. A charging party using disparate treatment will typically allege the denial of an
employment opportunity because of his or her accent or manner of speaking is discrimination on the
basis of national origin. EEOC Compliance Manual § 623.10 (1987). See, e.g., Carino v. University
of Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1984) (a Filipino employee naturalized in the
United States was improperly demoted on the basis of national origin, although his accent did not
interfere with his ability to perform his job) and Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Public Works, 628 F.2d 980
(6th Cir. 1980) (a Polish immigrant was impermissibly denied promotion because of his accent,
despite his above average command of English).
134. 618 F.2d at 270.
135. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
Until 1988, all the Supreme Court's decisions using disparate impact theory involved objective, stan-
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fore, although the policy or practice is applied evenly to all employees, it
has a disproportionate effect on members of a particular race, color, sex,
religion or national origin. 13 6 Most English-only rules are analyzed
under disparate impact theory and allege discrimination on the basis of
national origin.13 7 The court failed to accept Garcia's argument, holding
that there is no disparate impact if the affected employee "could readily
comply with the speak-English-only rule [and] as to him non-observance
was a matter of choice."1 3
8
The court concluded that a bilingual employee's desire to speak his
native language is not an immutable characteristic like place of birth,
race or sex.' 39 The Fifth Circuit accepted Gloor's business reasons for
the English-only rule with little analysis. Gloor offered three major argu-
ments: 1) English-speaking customers objected to conversations between
employees in Spanish, which they could not understand; 2) requiring bi-
lingual employees to speak English in the workplace, except when they
served Hispanic customers, would improve their literacy in English; 3)
the rule would enable Gloor Lumber's English-speaking supervisors to
supervise Hispanic employees more effectively.' The Fifth Circuit in-
terpreted national origin discrimination very narrowly, and declined to
critically examine Gloor's business reasons for the English-only rule.
While no violation of Title VII was found by the Gloor court, the Gutier-
rez14 1 court evaluated a similar rule, enacted under similar circumstances
and came to the opposite conclusion.
2. Language as an Important Aspect of National Origin
Discrimination
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal court to endorse the EEOC
guidelines on English-only rules.'42 The Gutierrez court struck down a
rule imposed by three municipal judges prohibiting bilingual court clerks
from speaking to each other in Spanish except during breaks. The court
found that the English-only policy had a discriminatory impact on His-
dardized employment tests or hiring criteria. In 1988, in the case of Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), the high court expanded the theory's application, holding that disparate
impact theory also applies to subjective employment practices.
136. Id. at 335 n.15. The court held in Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981) that a
party may rely solely upon disparate impact theory of discrimination as recognized in Griggs v.
Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). To establish a cause of action based on this theory, no intent to
discriminate need be shown.
137. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 133, at § 623.6.
138. 618 F.2d at 270.
139. Id. at 269.
140. Id. at 267.
141. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S.
1016 (1989).
142. Id. Telephone interview with Robert T. Olmos attorney with the EEOC regional office
(Los Angeles office) (November 16, 1990).
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panics and was not justified by "business necessity." '43 To meet the busi-
ness necessity test, the court held that the employer's justification must
be "sufficiently compelling to override the discriminatory impact."' "
The challenged practice must also "effectively carry out the business pur-
pose it is alleged to serve, and there must be available no acceptable less
discriminatory alternative which would accomplish the purpose as
well."145
Applying this stringent test, the appeals court rejected the five major
arguments put forward by the employers to justify their English-only
rule. First, the employers argued that the state and country needs to
have a single language system. This argument, however, was undercut
by the fact that it was an important part of the clerks' duty to communi-
cate with the non-English speaking public in Spanish."1' Second, the de-
fendants said if an English-only rule was not imposed in the workplace, it
would turn into a "Tower of Babel." This claim was contradicted by the
fact that the use of Spanish was part of the normal press of court busi-
ness. 14 7 Third, appellants asserted that English-only rules are necessary
to promote racial harmony. This allegation was unsupported by any evi-
dence, in fact, racial hostility was increased between Hispanic and non-
Spanish speaking employees because the English-only rule made Hispan-
ics feel belittled.148 Fourth, employers contend that the English-only
rule is necessary because several supervisors do not speak or understand
Spanish and they need to monitor the work of the clerks. However, a
more effective way of monitoring the work product of the clerks, since
they are required to use their bilingual skills on the job, would be to hire
Spanish-speaking supervisors." Finally, the appellants argue that the
English-only rule is required by the California Constitution. The court,
however, considered the constitutional amendment which was passed by
the voters in 1986, as "primarily a symbolic statement" which did not
affect communications between co-workers in government.' 50 Gutierrez,
143. Id. at 1039-40.
144. Id. at 1041.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1042.
147. Id.
148. Id. The appellants also contended that there was a need to assuage non-Spanish-speaking
employees' fears and suspicions that Spanish-speakers were engaged in conversations that non-Span-
ish-speakers could not understand. There was no probative evidence of the Spanish language being
used to conceal conversations. Id. at 1042-43.
149. Id. at 1043.
150. Id. at 1044. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6 provides:
(a) Purpose: English is the common language of the people of the United States of America and the
State of California. This section is intended to preserve, protect and strengthen the English
language, and not to supersede any of the rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution.
(b) ... English is the official language of the State of California.
(c) Enforcement: The Legislature shall enforce this section by appropriate legislation. The Legisla-
ture and officials of the State of California shall take all steps necessary to insure that the role of
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like Garcia, argued that the English-only rule had a disparate impact on
Hispanic employees. By failing to meet the rigorous business necessity
standard, the court agreed that the plaintiff successfully established an
adverse impact claim."'1 The Gutierrez court rejected the reasoning in
Gloor, relying on the EEOC English-only guidelines and a broader inter-
pretation of national origin. 152
Gutierrez is an especially important case for two reasons. First, it care-
fully lays out a stringent test of business necessity. Second, the case pro-
vides a much broader interpretation of the connection between language
and national origin. The court wrote that "[t]he cultural identity of cer-
tain minority groups is tied to the use of their primary tongue. The mere
fact that an employee is bilingual does not eliminate the relationship be-
tween his primary language and the culture that is derived from his na-
tional origin."' I " The Ninth Circuit, contrary to the Fifth Circuit, found
that language is an important aspect of national origin. The Gutierrez
decision, before it was vacated as moot by the Supreme Court, created a
split between the Circuits. 54 If applied by other courts, the reasoning in
the Gutierrez decision would invalidate the vast majority of English-only
workplace rules, which usually either rely on one or more of the justifica-
tions raised in this case or take a narrow view of the connection between
language and national origin discrimination. 5
In addition to the ambivalent standard in the area of language and
national origin discrimination, two other areas cast uncertainty on the
future of Title VII litigation. The first problem area concerns the proper
burden on employers in defending Title VII lawsuits in light of the recent
Supreme Court case of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.1 16 The second
problem area in Title VII litigation concerns when English-only rules
may be justifiably imposed. In Wards Cove, the court held that a chal-
lenged practice need not be "essential" or "indispensable" to the em-
ployer's business. 57 Rather the high court concluded that it need only
English as the common language of the State of California is preserved and enhanced. The
Legislature shall make no law which diminishes or ignores the role of English as the common
language of the State of California.
(d) .. .Any person who is a resident of or doing business in the State of California shall have
standing to sue the State of California to enforce this statute.
151. Id. at 1040.
152. Id. at 1039-41.
153. Id. at 1039.
154. Perea, English-only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the Work-
place, 23 J. LAw REFORM 265, 272. Perea argues that courts should evaluate English-only rules in
terms of disparate treatment and disparate impact. He would require employers under disparate
treatment to establish a bona fide occupational qualification defense. If the court adheres to the
disparate impact theory, he maintains employers should be required to meet a strict standard of
business necessity. Id. at 293-303.
155. Chen, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
156. 409 U.S. 642 (1989).
157. Id. at 659.
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serve "in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the em-
ployer."'"8 Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the as-
serted business justifications are not sufficient.' 59 Wards Cove would
lessen the burden on employers in defending Title VII lawsuits and
lower the stringent definition of business necessity employed in Gutier-
rez." 6 A second problem area concerns when English-only laws may
legitimately be imposed under the EEOC guidelines. 6 ' The EEOC's
commentary to its guidelines indicates that business necessity would ex-
ist, "where safety is a consideration such as in work situations requiring
close coordination among employees where the failure to maintain close
communication could result in injury to persons or property."' 62 Such
situations include the performance of surgery or drilling of oil wells, or
the use of dangerous equipment. 163 While the courts have ruled on a few
such situations,' there exists a large gray area of what constitutes legiti-
mate business necessity or business justification.
A recent case filed by the Asian Pacific American Legal Center and
the American Civil Liberties Union, 6 ' which will soon go to trial may
help clarify these problem areas. Aida Dimaranan, an assistant head
nurse on the maternity ward, was reprimanded several times for speaking
Tagalog, a language of the Philippines, with fellow nurses. 66 While hos-
pital administrators deny that there was ever a no-Tagalog, English-only
policy on the maternity ward, Dimaranan's performance evaluations suf-
fered after she criticized the policy. As a consequence she was reassigned
to another position.' 67 Only after an EEOC charge was filed, did the
hospital administration attempt to clarify the language policy. The vice
president for nursing services stated that hospital nurses could speak an-
other language, but should exercise their "best professional judg-
158. Id.
159. Id. at 657.
160. See supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text.
161. EEOC Guidelines, supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
162. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 133, at § 623-12.
163. Id.
164. In Saucedo v. Brother Well Service, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979), the court
found that although requiring communications in English during a drilling operation was permissi-
ble, the company's termination of an employee for speaking two words of Spanish on the job in a
dangerous situation violated Title VII. In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.
1987) employee disc-jockey's claim failed when he refused to comply with the employer's decision to
change the format of a radio program to English-only, instead of English and Spanish. Business
necessity existed since the English-only order was motivated by market, rather than racial,
considerations.
165. Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Center, No. CV 89-4299 ER(JRx). Plaintiff's trial
brief. Telephone interview November 16, 1990 with Kathryn Imahara staff attorney with the Asian
Pacific American Legal Center of Los Angeles, California.
166. Id. at 5-10.
167. Id. at 11-13.
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ment." ' 6  No adequate definition of this term was given.' 69
The Dimaranan court must decide whether English-only laws consti-
tute national origin discrimination. The court will also have the opportu-
nity to set out the correct standard of business necessity or business
justification. The requirements for notice as set out in the EEOC guide-
lines 7° will also be a central concern. Finally, the court must decide
whether the English-only rule has an adverse impact on Filipino
nurses. 171
As more immigrants enter the work force, an increasing number of
employers have instituted English-only rules prohibiting languages other
than English in the workplace. In order to carry out the intent of Title
VII, courts should adopt the EEOC Guidelines and recognize the close
association between language and national origin. The long history of
discrimination against members of language minority groups in the
United States suggests that they, like persons whose race or religion dif-
fers from those of the majority, warrant protection under Title VII.
IV. MAJOR FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR LANGUAGE MINORITIES
Current English-only efforts are challenging government services for
language minorities. Bilingual education and bilingual ballots are partic-
ularly singled out by English-only forces, since they are perceived as de-
terrents to learning English. Bilingual education obstructs students
from learning English and bilingual ballots send an erroneous message to
non-English speakers that they can participate in the political system
without learning English.172 Four major statutes in addition to Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, provide some protection for language mi-
norities in the areas of education and voting. This section will briefly
analyze the rights of language minorities under the Bilingual Education
Act 17 3 , Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 7 4 , the Equal Education
168. Id. at 11. When asked about a situation of what "best professional judgment" meant, the
vice president for nursing could not give a definition.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 20. The EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7(c) states: It is common for individuals whose primary language is not English to inadver-
tently change to speaking their primary language. Therefore, if an employer believes it has a busi-
ness necessity for a speak-English-only rule at certain times, the employer should inform its
employees of the general circumstances when speaking only in English is required and of the conse-
quences of violating the rule. If an employer fails to effectively notify its employees of the rule and
makes an adverse employment decision against an individual based on a violation of the rule, the
Commission will consider the employer's application of the rule as evidence of discrimination on the
basis of national origin.
171. Id. at 17.
172. See Califa, supra note 1, at 299-304, 312, 317-319 and Cordero, Constitutional Limitations
on Official English Declarations, 20 N.M.L. REV. 17, 46 (1990).
173. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3386 (1982).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1982).
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Act" 5 , and the federal Voting Rights Act.
176
A. The Bilingual Education Act
The Bilingual Education Act was the first piece of federal legislation
that recognized the fact that minority language children were not receiv-
ing an adequate education in schools that operated exclusively in Eng-
lish. 177 The new Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, which became law in 1968, authorized resources to support educa-
tional programs, to train teachers and aides, and to develop appropriate
instructional material. The focus of the law was children who were both
poor and "educationally disadvantaged because of their inability to speak
English." 
7 8
Although there was optimism surrounding the Bilingual Education
Act, which passed through the Congress with remarkably little contro-
versy, this optimism was short-lived.'7 9 Under pressure from the White
House, Congress failed to approve funding for the bill during 1968. "0 In
1969, it appropriated $7.5 million, which was only able to serve 27,000
children and to finance seventy-six projects.'' By 1973, the act had
benefitted only two percent of the nation's bilingual school children. 82
Since that time, the amount has increased to 200 million in 1989.1 3
While more children have been served, the resources have been inade-
quate for the increased non-English speaking population. 8 4
The Bilingual Education Act did not provide a right to bilingual edu-
cation, rather it offered financial assistance for local bilingual programs
designed to meet the needs of children with limited facility in English.'8 5
When the act did not prove to be the panacea, that many of its support-
ers had hoped it to be, parents of minority language children gradually
turned to the federal courts to answer the question of whether there was
a constitutional right to bilingual education. 8 6
175. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1982).
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1982).
177. McFadden, Bilingual Education and the Law, 12 J.L. & EDuc. 1, 8 (1983).
178. CRAWFORD, supra note 30, at 32.
179. McFadden, supra note 177, at 8-9.
180. CRAWFORD, supra note 30, at 33.
181. Id.
182. McFadden, supra note 177, at 8.
183. 47 U.S.C. § 3282(b).
184. See CRAWFORD, supra note 30, at 70-84 for the negative responses of William Bennett, the
former Secretary of Education, toward the funding of the Bilingual Education Act. He was particu-
larly opposed to bilingual programs, which used the mother tongue in the teaching of limited non-
English speaking students.
185. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261 (1982). See also Cordero, supra note 172, at 47.
186. McFadden, supra at note 177, at 8-10.
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B. The Constitutional Issue Avoided: Lau and Title VI
In Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court held that placing non-English
speaking students in a classroom with no special assistance and providing
them with instruction that was not comprehensible to them violated Title
VI of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.187 In Lau, a class of approxi-
mately 1800 non-English speaking Chinese students in the San Francisco
schools raised an equal protection claim and a claim under Title V.' 88
Title VI prohibits discrimination based on "race, color or national origin
[in] any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' 89 In
its analysis, the Supreme Court observed the importance of the English
language in the California educational scheme. English fluency was a
prerequisite for high school graduation. School attendance was compul-
sory. Furthermore, English as the basic language of instruction was
mandated by the state. I I Given these state-imposed standards, "there is
no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same fa-
cilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not un-
derstand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful
education."' 9' For Judge Blackmum, numbers were also "at the heart of
[the] case."' 92
In reaching this conclusion the Lau court relied on the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, in
addition to Title VI. The guidelines required that school districts take
affirmative steps to address the language needs of minority language chil-
dren. Failure to rectify language deficiencies constitute discrimination
on the basis of national origin, even if it is not deliberate. 93 The Court
did not resolve the question of whether the failure to provide educational
assistance to non-English speaking students violated the Constitution.
As the only Supreme Court case on the issue of the right of language
minority children to an equal education, the Lau case established guide-
lines for similar cases. Courts tended to: 1) avoid the constitutional is-
sue; 2) rely on the discriminatory effect rationalization of Title VI; 3)
choose a remedy on a case-by-case basis; and 4) take into account the
number of students involved. 19
In Serna v. Portales, 9" the Tenth Circuit closely followed the reason-
ing in Lau, ruling on Title VI rather than constitutional grounds. The
187. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
188. Id. at 564-66.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1982).
190. 414 U.S. at 566.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 572.
193. Id. at 567.
194. McFadden, supra at note 177, at 10.
195. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Serna court noted that the children were required to attend schools
where classes were conducted in English. Since it failed to provide reme-
dial measures to meet the needs of Mexican-American students, the Por-
tales school curriculum was discriminatory and in violation of Title VI
and the HEW regulations. 96 While there appears to be a limited right to
rectify language deficiencies where school policies have had the effect of
discriminating against national origin minorities under Title VI, there is
not an absolute right to bilingual education. In school districts with both
language and racial minorities, conflicting remedies present difficult
problems. In 1975, one year after approving a bilingual education rem-
edy in Serna, the Tenth Circuit overturned a court decision implement-
ing a bilingual program in Keyes v. School District No. 1.197 The court
differentiated this case from Lau and Serna in that the Denver school
authorities "made an effort to identify students with language difficulties
and directed several program to their needs .... 198 What was more
important, however, was the fact that the bilingual instruction remedy
had been part of a larger desegregation plan. In order to maintain the
bilingual education program, it would have been necessary to leave four
elementary schools with significant minority enrollments. Faced with
the reality of choosing between bilingual education and desegregation,
the Keyes court decided that "such instruction must be subordinate to a
plan of school desegregation."' 99 With the future of Lau remedies in-
creasingly uncertain, there has been more reliance on the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity Act of 1974. Shortly after the Lau decision, Congress
in effect codified the Supreme Court's holding.
C. The Equal Educational Opportunities Act
Section 1703(0 of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, requires
school districts to "take appropriate action to overcome language barri-
ers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional
programs." 2' Soon after the passage of section 1703(0 the Fifth Circuit
held that a violation of this act requires no discriminatory intent on the
part of school authorities, simply a failure to take "appropriate ac-
tion.""'' The courts have been split, however, on the form that this "ap-
propriate" action must take. In 1978, the district court for the Eastern
District of New York, in Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School District
held that where a bilingual program is implemented under section
1703(0, it must include instruction in the child's native language in most
196. Id. at 1153-54.
197. 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
198. 521 F.2d at 483.
199. Id. at 480.
200. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(0 (1990).
201. Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1975).
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subjects. 20 2 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, in Guadalupe Organi-
zation, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School, concluded that appropriate ac-
tion under 1703(0 need not be bilingual-bicultural education staffed with
bilingual instructors.20 3 The English as a second language (ELS) pro-
gram proposed for the Arizona school district qualifies as an appropriate
program for English-deficient children.2"
The interpretation of 1703(0 was clarified in the 1981 Fifth Circuit
case of Castaneda v. Pickard.2 "5 Agreeing with Cintron, the court held
that it is not necessary for a school district to intentionally discriminate
in order for 1703(0 to be invoked. It also determined that the type of
"appropriate" compensatory languages programs should be left up to the
state and local educational authorities.2 '6 Finally, the Castaneda court
specified that at a minimum schools must have a program predicated on
and "reasonably calculated" to implement a "sound" educational theory
and must be adequate in actually overcoming language barriers of the
students.2"7 While Section 1703(0 of the Equal Education Opportunity
Act provides some protection for language minorities, there is not a right
to bilingual-bicultural education.
D. The Voting Rights Act
Another significant piece of legislation is the federal Voting Rights Act
as amended in 1975 and extended in 1982.20 In response to evidence of
discrimination in voting directed at non-English speakers, in 1975 Con-
gress modified the 1965 Voting Rights Act.2" The 1975 Amendments
required that state and local governments publish bilingual election
materials when more than five percent of the voting-age residents were
members of a single language minority, and the illiteracy rate in English
of such groups was higher then the national average.210 The 1975
Amendments have significantly increased voter participation by non-
English speakers. 2" The Act, however, has proven inadequate to safe-
202. 455 F. Supp. 56, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
203. 587 F.2d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 1978).
204. Id.
205. 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).
206. Id. at 1009.
207. Id. at 1009-10.
208. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1982).
209. Note, Voting Rights and the Constitution: The Case Disenfranchisement of Non-English
Speaking Citizens, 97 YALE L.J. 1419, 1422 (1988).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f) (1982). Under section b(f)(3-4), a jurisdiction is covered if over five
percent of the voting-age citizens are members of a single language minority group and if the previ-
ous presidential election was conducted only in English and less than fifty percent of voting-age
citizens were registered. Section 1973b(f)(c) also requires that more than five percent of voting-age
citizens belong to a single language minority group. Coverage is triggered under this provision if
either the jurisdiction-wide or statewide illiteracy rate exceeds the national rate.
211. R. BRIScHETro, BILINGUAL ELECTIONS AT WORK IN THE SOUTHWEST 62-177 (1982).
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guard thousands of non-English speakers. After a change in methodol-
ogy in determining whether a person belongs to a minority group,
roughly half of the counties previously covered were dropped from the
requirement.21 2 In California, for example, only seven counties meet the
requirement: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego, do not meet
the requisite five percent figure.21 3 These cities are so large that despite
the fact that a city like Los Angeles had 69,000 Spanish monolinguals in
1984, they do not total five percent of the population.21 4
E. -Official English Laws and Challenges to Federal Programs
While several federal constitutional amendments have been proposed
by English-only proponents, they appear unlikely to win Congressional
approval anytime soon.215 Their purpose seems to be to advance the
political agenda of U.S. English of eliminating bilingual education and
bilingual ballots and other bilingual services. State English-only laws
challenging federal statutes have rarely been interpreted by the courts.
Most state English-only laws are broad statements making English the
official language of the state.21 6 One of the few state cases is a Illinois
challenge to the Voting Rights Act. In Puerto Rican Organization for
Political Action v. Kusper,2 t7 the court held that the Illinois statute was
largely symbolic. In Kusper the court granted a preliminary injunction
compelling the Chicago Board of Commissioners to provide assistance in
Spanish to Puerto Rican citizens who were unable to read or understand
English.21  The 1965 Voting Rights Act and the 1970 amendment pro-
hibit states from conditioning the right to vote of persons who attended
school in Puerto Rico on their ability to read or understand English.21 9
The board of election commissioners appealed, arguing that the injunc-
tion required them to violate the state's official English law.220 The court
held the statute to be purely symbolic, observing that it "appears with
212. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 55 app. (1980) with Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 49 Fed.
Reg. 25,887 (1984).
213. Note, supra note 218, at 1423, n.28.
214. Id.
215. See CRAWFORD, supra note 30, at 61.
216. See supra note 4 and accompanying text, the Arizona amendment was an exception to this
general pattern.
217. 490 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1973).
218. Id. at 577.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(l)(2). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this provi-
sion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). This provision was also upheld in Torres v.
Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court concluded that New York City's practice of
conducting elections by preparing ballots, voting instructions and other election materials only in
English, constituted a condition on the right to vote under the Voting Rights Act and deprived
Puerto Ricans of their right to vote.
220. 490 F.2d at 577. The Illinois statute states: "The official language of the State of Illinois is
English." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 177.
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others naming the state bird and the state song" it has "never been used
to prevent publication of official materials in other languages."22' The
Gutierrez court came to a similar conclusion with respect to the Califor-
nia official English statute under Title VII.222
V. CONCLUSION
The English-only movement, like the Americanization movement
before it in the 1920s, has prompted a resurgence of anti-foreigner senti-
ment. Fuelled by high rates of immigration from Latin American and
Asian countries, English-only forces have attempted to limit bilingual
services and encourage English-only laws in the public and private sec-
tors. They seek to limit bilingual education and bilingual ballots, and to
enforce English-only rules in the workplace. In the second half of the
twentieth century non-English speaking immigrants do have more legal
language than those who entered before them. There is not a entitlement
to language rights, however, either under the constitution or under the
major federal statutes. The analysis has shown that courts have rejected
challenges to language minorities unless they fall squarely within the
scope of national origin discrimination. Statutes giving access to reme-
dial education programs for those who lack proficiency in English have
established a limited right for language minorities, however, these pro-
grams are not required to use instruction in the mother tongue of limited
English-speaking students. The Voting Rights Act has mandated bilin-
gual voting assistance for non-English speaking citizens, but many lan-
guage minorities remain outside the requirements of this Act.
The legal effect of state official English laws remains unclear. Many of
the state laws are very broad. Thus far courts have ruled that they are of
symbolic value. If enforced, they could deprive language minorities of
important rights in the workplace, voting booth, and in the education
arena. English-only forces have been more successful in using the laws
politically than in the courtroom. In California, the passage of Proposi-
tion 63 in 1986, the official English constitutional amendment, was em-
ployed to pressure the Governor into vetoing bilingual education
legislation. On the other hand, the Attorney General in California re-
jected a demand by U.S. English to ban election materials published in
Chinese and Spanish by San Francisco and other jurisdictions.223 There
remain many troubling aspects of the English-only movement and the
official English laws. The laws have not done anything to increase profi-
ciency of individuals with a limited knowledge of English. Rather than
promote national unity and tolerance of Hispanic and Asian newcomers,
221. 490 F.2d at 577.
222. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
223. See CRAWFORD, supra note 30, at 58.
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the laws have promoted an anti-foreigner attitude among the population.
Immigrants are perceived as refusing to assimilate and to learn the Eng-
lish language, even though studies show that most language minorities
lose their mother tongues by the second or at most the third generation.
There is a need to rethink to what extent one should have the "right to
language" '224 independent of the national origin label. Unless there are
proper safeguards for language minorities, U.S. English and allied groups
will be able to promote a hidden agenda that has little to do with
language.
224. See the analysis in Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23
Hous. L. REV. 885 (1986).
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